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Abstract
We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights
in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists
(VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions
rights along three time dimensions: the point in time when the contract was signed, the
expected duration of the contract and the actual duration of the relationship. We show that
contracts are not static but that control rights are adjusted along all three time dimensions.
First, we observe a change in the structure but not in the level of the VC’s control rights
during the relationship between the VC and the portfolio firm. While venture capitalists re-
turn superfluous operational rights to entrepreneurs, they gain (valuable) exit rights during
the course of the relationship. Second, we show that the shorter the expected length of the
VC’s engagement the more control rights are allocated to the hands of the VC. Finally, we
observe that learning took place in the German VC market.
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exit rights.
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1 Introduction
Contracts constitute the backbone of any financial transaction. However, only in recent years has
some light been shed onto the structure of these contracts and their implications for theory1. This
paper aims to join the fray to widen our understanding of the determinants of these contracts
and their relation to theory. We do this especially with respect to the analysis of the incomplete
contracting literature and the decision and control rights they describe using venture capital
contracts.
We study the complete universe of decision and control rights found in a broad and representative
sample of 290 VC contracts with 464 investment rounds for the German VC market. In addition
to previous studies, we include veto and exit rights in our analysis and we study the evolution
of contracts over various dimensions of time.
With respect to these time dimensions our analysis reveals three major points. First, when
studying the evolution of control rights over time, we show a non-monotone pattern between the
VC’s share of these rights and the duration of the VC’s relationship with the firm. On the one
hand, we detect a re-transfer of operational rights (i.e. rights that allow the VC to interfere with
operational decisions) back to the entrepreneur over the lifetime of the relationship between the
VC and the firm. On the other hand, however, we see an increase in the level of exit rights (i.e.
rights that allow the VC to determine the type of exit channel to be chosen) given to the VC.
Hence, the VC’s control and decision rights do not decrease over time, but rather the structure
changes. Thereby, we stress that control is a multi-dimensional variable which may have different
rationales in the various situations.
Second, our analysis reveals that significant learning processes occurred in the German VC
market. Starting from scratch, over time VCs adopted more and more elements of US style
contracts in the area of decision and control rights. Initially VCs did not use control and decision
rights. This pattern clearly changed over time, even if we control for VC type and take changes in
the VC’s bargaining power into account. Furthermore, we show that the expected time to exit is
an important determinant of the allocation of decision and control rights. The closer the expected
exit, i.e. the shorter the expected length of the relationship, the more decision and control rights
are in the hand of the VC. Finally, we show that the major theories explaining the use of decision
and control rights, e.g. the Grossman/Hart/Moore approach, the Aghion/Bolton model, the
1 See the contributions of Gompers (1999) [20], Hellmann (1998) [28], and Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) [33] &
(2004) [34].
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Aghion/Tirole approach and Dessein’s2 explanation are all relevant, albeit for different rights
and settings.
Our analysis extends the existing literature in several dimensions. First, by including more
rights, particulary operational and exit rights, in the analysis, we can expand the work that
Kaplan/Stro¨mberg (2003) [33] & (2004) [34] began3. To be more precise, rather than looking at
the whole contractual design, we focus on a very detailed analysis of the allocation of control and
decision rights (DCR) between the VC and the entrepreneur and their evolution over different
time dimensions. We consider rounds4, time periods and expected time to exit. With the first,
we are able to explore the dynamics of the VC-entrepreneur relationship. As mentioned, this
extension is fruitful, in that we can show that by including these additional rights, the overall
picture in terms of dynamics becomes more complex than previous research suggests.
Second, our analysis of the link between the expected contract length or time-to-exit and the
structure of the control and decision rights is novel. We are able to show that the expected
duration has an impact on the use of these rights. We are not aware of other studies that
attempt to do this.
Third, we show that the contracts initially found in Germany evolve from being ”Lerner &
Schoar” type contracts to ”Kaplan & Stro¨mberg” type contracts. In other words we are able
to show that learning takes place in venture capital contracting over time. By looking into the
evolution over time periods we are able to reveal a link between the evolution of contracts and
the maturity of the VC market. This allows us to reconcile the differing results found in Kaplan
et al. (2005) [35] and Lerner/Schoar (2004) [36]. The former show that more experienced VCs
write more complex US style contracts, while the latter show that in developing countries VCs
tend to write relatively simple contracts. By demonstrating that learning and convergence to
US contracts takes place, we show that less sophisticated VCs are actually able to learn. This
suggests that the differences observed by Kaplan et al. (2005) [35] are not set in stone, at least
not for a VC market with a sound legal system5.
Our data base stems from a research cooperation with KfW (Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau),
2 See Grossman/Hart (1986) [22], Hart/Moore (1990) [25], Aghion/Bolton (1992) [1], Aghion/Tirole (1997) [3],
and Dessein (2004) [17].
3 This also includes the work of Hellmann (1998) [28] who looks at the right of the VC to replace the entrepreneur.
4 We are not the first ones to look at the evolution over rounds, as Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) [33] do this too.
However, they restrict their analysis to voting rights, board rights, investment amounts and auto conversion
clauses.
5 In the last 2006 World Competitiveness Ranking Germany scored first place in terms of property rights
protections and contract enforcement.
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the largest German promotional bank. KfW has supported a large proportion of all VC deals
in Germany over the last 20 years and has therefore received all written information concerning
the deals. Contrary to the majority of empirical studies, it is not based on survey data but the
information was gathered directly from the contracts. Moreover, it is based on all documents
concerning a specific deal, i.e. the business plan, the balance sheet, the term sheet, the share-
holders’ agreement, the bylaws of the corporation or company, additional agreements, procedural
rules and key employment contracts. In addition, it covers a large time period that extends from
1990 until 2004. Finally, it constitutes a representative sample of the German venture capital
industry as it is a random sample of all projects supported by KfW6.
Our data set depicts the entire universe of decision and control rights allocated between the
VC(s) and the entrepreneur. These rights obviously serve quite different purposes and are also
applicable in quite different situations. In order to acquire a more structured view on these
instruments of corporate governance and to bring them together with theoretical considerations,
we decided to group them into three different parts.
First, we take a closer look into the decision and control rights which permit the VC to interfere
into management decision in normal times (operational control rights). We thereby also stress
the potential separation between cash flow and control rights.
Second, we bundle all liquidation rights (such as put options, staging, debt) together and ask
for factors determining the allocation of these DCRs to the VC. In addition, we are interested
whether these instruments are complements or substitutes.
Finally, we look into a quite specific class of control and decision rights, namely exit rights which
give either the VC (in most cases) or the entrepreneur specific rights in the case of exit. These
exit rights have to be seen against the background of the temporary nature of the engagement of
the VC in its portfolio firms. Owing to the limited period of time of the engagement of the VC7
an efficient exit decision becomes vital. Overcoming hold-up problems and making sure that the
most efficient exit channel is chosen plays a crucial role in this part of the venture capital cycle.
In two companion papers we make use of this data base focusing on other aspects of VC con-
tracts. Bienz/Hirsch (2005) [9] empirically investigate staging and the different modes of staging
in venture capital contracts against the insights of the venture capital and the renegotiation
6 KfW was involved in more than 60% of all VC deals in Germany. Moreover, since KfW’s goal was to reject
only very few deals offered, there should be no selection bias in the KfW sample itself.
7 This aims to solve the agency problems between the VC and its investors; see e.g. Gompers/Lerner (1999) [21]
and Sahlman (1990) [38] on this.
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literature. Hirsch/Walz (2006) [31] look into the behavior of different types of VCs with respect
to contractual design. They investigate whether observed differences between different types of
VC stems from selection effects (i.e. different VCs select different portfolio firms) or indeed from
different behavior with respect to the corporate governance of their portfolio firms.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will describe our data set. We will
then present our descriptive results. A section that presents regression results follows. We will
discuss alternative interpretations of our results in a fifth section. The sixth section will present
our conclusion.
2 The Data Set
Our analysis uses a proprietary, hand-collected data set which was compiled on the basis of
comprehensive and detailed documents made available to us by the KfW in Frankfurt, Germany.
The KfW has a unique position in Germany’s venture capital market. Being Germany’s largest
promotional bank, it is in charge of large support programmes that channel state funds to the
private sector. However, during the time period covered in our sample (the time period between
1990 and 2004) KfW never invested directly in any of the portfolio firms but supported the
firms by promoting the investment of the VC. In this position, it became indirectly involved in
a significant part of all venture capital deals in Germany during the last decade. Since these
programs allowed VCs to partially refinance their financial engagement in the portfolio firms via
KfW, VCs had to apply for these refinancing schemes by submitting all details of the relationship
between the VC and the portfolio firm, most notably, the term sheets, the business plans and
the shareholder’s agreement. By giving us access to these documents, KfW gave us the unique
chance to collect detailed information on the relationship between the VC and its portfolio firm.
Also, KfW supported a large proportion of the population of all investments realized by the
German venture capital industry in the time period under consideration8.
In order to reduce the very time-intensive task of collecting detailed information from the share-
holders agreements and the other documents to a manageable size, we selected a random sample.
We categorized each portfolio company into one of three classes with respect to their investment
date (before 1997, between 1998 and 2000, and 2001-2004) and eight classes with respect to
the programme or programme combination through which their VC investor was supported by
8 According to the German Venture Capital Association ([13] and [14]), there were 11854 seed, start-up and
expansion deals by its members in the relevant time period; KfW supported almost 7100 deals of potential
members. This implies a market coverage of approximately 60%.
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the KfW. This categorization was undertaken with the objective of achieving a balanced rep-
resentation of the population. We then drew a proportional random sample of 300 portfolio
companies.
For each investment round we evaluated the company’s balance sheet data and its business
plan in order to get information with respect to the market position of the company and details
about the project financed. Moreover, we gathered detailed information about the firm’s security
design, the timing and conditions of the investment, the syndication of the investment, control
and information rights of the venture capitalists and exit covenants from the term sheet and
the shareholder’s agreement. We translated this information into quantifiable variables. We
complemented this data set with information about the venture capitalist who was refinanced by
KfW, i.e. its type (as indicated by the German venture capital organization), origin or industry
focus.
As usual in this type of studies we were confronted with the problem that not all data were
always available. Thus observations may vary depending on the variable studied. Typically, the
amount invested and valuations were the most reliable variables, whereas information on staging
or investment memoranda were sometimes missing.
2.1 Sample and Sample Selection Issues
Table 1 gives an overview of the sample that constitutes the basis for our analysis. Unfortunately,
the data for 10 portfolio companies could not be evaluated, therefore our random sample finally
consists of 290 portfolio companies which were financed in 464 investment rounds from 1990
until 2004.
As already indicated, this sample is a random draw from a large proportion of all investments
in the German venture capital industry in the time period under consideration. Therefore, we
are confident that we do not have any major selection bias in our sample in this direction. In
addition, since we have been responsible for the sample selection process ourselves, we have been
able to make sure that no selection bias occurred via the provider of all of our documents (the
KfW). Finally, due to KfW’s objective to support as many applicants as possible (and given the
attractiveness of the programs) there also seems to be no selection effect with respect to the
entire KfW sample relative to the German market itself.
One obvious selection bias which we were not able to circumvent is the fact that we are con-
centrating on one particular geographic region (Germany) and the associated venture capital
market. To a lesser degree this is true for the time period. We take all this into consideration by
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interpreting our data sample as the description of a situation of a young and evolving venture
capital market. We especially address potential dynamics of the contractual designs along the
time axis and thereby look for learning processes which may have occurred in this maturing
venture capital market.
Table 2 provides an overview of the main characteristics of our sample. The average amount
invested per financing round is about 5.4 million euros and the portfolio companies are on average
4.77 years old when they receive VC financing for the first time. The medians are considerably
smaller (1.3 million euros and 3 years) which indicates that some outliers exist. At this point, one
can already infer that the percentage of start-up financing in our sample is quite high. Indeed,
10.3% of the financing rounds correspond to seed financing and 56.2% to start-up financing
whereas only 19% of the financing rounds are related to expansion and 6% to a later stage9.
Most of the portfolio companies of our sample (70%) are so-called ”Gesellschaften mit beschra¨nkter
Haftung” (Limited Liability Firm) and only 28% are so-called ”Aktiengesellschaften” (Public
Limited Liability Firm). Almost all portfolio companies have their head office in Germany (92%)
but they are active in a broad range of industries: 5% in the field of biology or biotechnology,
12% in the medical area, 27% in the IT and software branch, 6% in the telecommunications and
10% in the internet sector, 15% in automobiles and engineering and finally 4% in chemistry.
14% of all portfolio companies could not be classified in any of these industries. Finally, 39% of
all financing rounds were syndicated whereby the syndicate consists on average of 3.69 partners
and staging was used in 53% of all firms. We include data from 91 VCs, an average VC financing
5 firms, while the median VC finances 2 firms in our sample.
2.2 Variable Descriptions
Table 3 describes the variables of our data set. Variables that are self-explanatory are not listed.
Additionally some variables describing control rights are discussed in detail later on. Further
details can be found in the appendix.
3 Descriptive Results
In this section we describe our descriptive findings for the different types of control rights con-
sidered in this paper. We will first consider security choice in its relation to control rights. Then
9 For 8.5% we do not have any information about the investment phase.
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we will discuss the Venture Capitalist’s ability to disentangle voting and control rights. Finally,
we present results for the decision and control rights found in the contracts analyzed.
As we are interested in the evolution of these rights, we will structure our findings along the
different time dimensions inherent in these data: Rounds, calendar time and time remaining
until the VC exits his investment. For each of these categories we present summary statistics
and run simple univariate tests.
3.1 Securities
In this section we will start by discussing the VC’s securities. As a first step, table 4 presents
the type of securities used in our sample. The most important securities used are debt-equity
mixes, followed by pure debt and equity with a liquidation preference10. Our table documents
the wide variety of different securities used. Table 5 shows the evolution of the VC’s security
choice over the three time periods considered in our paper. What is clear is that in the third
period (2001-2004) more than 75% of all financing rounds use a form of equity that gives the
VC’s claim seniority over that of the entrepreneur. Equity with a liquidation preference accounts
for 33%, debt-equity mixes for about 24% and convertibles account for 15%. The 75% are in
strong contrast to the 40% encountered in the first period (1990-1997). The shift is mainly away
from pure debt finance towards more participation of VCs in the upside potential of the portfolio
firms. This is consistent with recent papers showing that VC finance requires not only the VC
to hold equity but also shows that this is optimal for the financier, given that the financier
provides the venture with value adding services (Berglo¨f (1994) [7], Bascha and Walz (2001)
[6], Casamatta (2003) [15], Schmidt (2003) [40], Dessi (2003) [18], Hellmann (2006) [29], and
Schindele (2006) [39]). It is also consistent with the fact that these papers predict downside
protection for the VC.
Two elements are different to the US: the relative frequency of debt finance and the relative
absence of US style convertible securities. The first phenomenon can be easily attributed to
the presence of public VCs, who prefer these securities11. The second observation is put into
perspective when one looks at the high number of debt-equity mixes. The payoff structure
of these securities closely resembles those of convertible securities, as they give the VC’s claim
seniority while still retaining the VC’s incentives by letting him participate in the upside. Kaplan
10 A liquidation preference gives the shareholder a senior cash-flow right for a previously defined amount in case
of a liquidation (including trade-sales and IPOs) .
11 Public VCs are supposed to promote ”entrepreneurship” and investment and therefore refrain from taking
equity stakes in the firm. For more on this topic see Hirsch and Walz (2005) [31].
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et al. (2004) [35] also find that these types of securities are often used instead of convertible
securities. Even more remarkable is the evolution over time, as the shift towards various forms of
equity with a liquidation preference is a first hint that there might be a trend towards US-style
contracting in the data.
3.2 Allocation of Board & Voting Rights
In panel two of tables 6 to 8 we analyze the evolution of board & voting rights along three
aspects of time: the round the investment has reached, the actual period in time the investment
took place and the expected contract duration. We then categorize control rights according to
their function in the firm.
What we find is that the VC’s voting and board rights increased significantly over both rounds
and periods in time from an average of 29% in the first round to 51% in the third round and
from an average of 18% in the period up to 1998 to 45% in the period after 2001. This shows
that VCs increased their voting rights in the firms up to levels comparable to those found by
Kaplan and Stro¨mberg in the US. Indeed, in the third round, in 53% of all cases, VCs had the
majority of votes in the firm’s shareholder meeting and controlled 62.5% of all boards. Similar
levels are found when we look at the third period in time, as in 41% of all cases the VC had the
majority in the shareholders meeting and controlled 50% of all boards.
This also shows us that VCs are able to separate voting rights from board rights. Three ways
are open to VCs in Germany for this: First, the German commercial code allows VCs to allocate
one third of all seats on the board without an election by including such a clause in the firm’s
charter. Second, VCs can ask entrepreneurs to agree to clauses in a shareholder agreement that
asks entrepreneurs to approve candidates put forth by the VC12. Third, the charter may also
include clauses that increase the majority required in corporate decisions above the usual 50%
threshold, giving the VC an effective veto right over decisions (but also the entrepreneur in some
cases).
3.3 Allocation of Cash-Flow Rights
In tables 6 and 7 we also analyze the evolution of cash-flow rights over rounds and periods.
In Germany, cash flow rights tend to be closely linked to voting rights (though not necessarily
12 Although lawyers point out that stipulations in the shareholder’s agreement (a voluntary agreement between
shareholders) are less effective than those in the firm’s charter.
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to board rights). There are several reasons for this. First, preference shares in Germany are
normally voting shares (so there is no separation). Second, vesting in Germany is different from
the US, as we will discuss later on. One effect is that no un-vested shares exist (that do not have
voting rights). Thus, in the case of pure equity, cash-flow and control rights clearly coincide.
Therefore, we find that the increase in the VC’s in cash flow rights mirrors the increase in voting
rights closely. They increased their share of cash-flow rights over both rounds and periods in
time from an average of 29% in the first round to 51% in the third round and from an average
of 18% in the period up to 1998 to 45% in the period after 2001. This shows that VCs indeed
increased their cash flow rights in the firms up to levels comparable to those found by Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg in the US.
This is consistent with a central result found in the contract theory literature. Hart and Moore
(1990) [25] show that ownership over assets should go to the party that has the highest incentives
to invest into the asset. Their result is confirmed here, as the entrepreneur retains ownership
of the firm in early rounds of investment. This is normally the phase where the entrepreneur
should invest into the firm to develop the firm’s business. In later rounds the VC’s experience in
the professionalisation of the firm matters more (Hellmann and Puri (2002) [30]) and therefore
ownership should switch to the VC. This is exactly what we can observe in the data.
However, in other cases, this close link is not so strong. One reason is that VCs have downside
protection for their cash flows. In the first round, 30% have this right, while in the third round
60% hold it. Indeed, in the third period, 69% hold a downside protection, up from 5% in the first
period. Of those that hold a downside protection only 10% have some form of protection that is
lower than their investment amount. 45% have the right to their initial amount, while the rest
has rights to more than the initial amount. Also VCs might hold debt instruments. Of course,
debt also gives the VC seniority. We will consider debt later when we focus on liquidation rights.
In contrast to the US, we find fewer contingent allocations of cash-flow rights to the VC. The
reasons for this are not clear. One reason could be that in Germany the allocation of equity to
the entrepreneur, based on the entrepreneur’s performance, is taxable. It seems to be the case
that there are other mechanisms to get around this issue. One mechanism seems to be the use of
milestone finance. In milestone finance the firm is guaranteed new money once it has exceeded
predefined milestones. For a detailed analysis see Bienz and Hirsch (2006) [9].
Vesting provisions in Germany work differently than in the US too. While VCs place vesting
provisions in 12% of all contracts, founder vesting is ”negative” vesting in the sense that the
entrepreneur loses his equity if he leaves the firm. Therefore, the entrepreneur does not have to
9
redeem his stake by showing good performance. Again, the reasons are not known, but taxes
might possibly explain this result.
3.4 Operational Rights
In a second step, we look at the evolution of operational or veto rights over time: table 6 shows
the evolution of our descriptive statistics over the investment rounds. Veto rights are given in
the first section of this table. We look at the following rights: veto rights against changes in the
shareholder’s agreement, against asset sales, against changes in the capital structure, against
changes of the firm’s business plan, other veto rights, a veto against financial decisions, against
changes in the firm’s head count, against dissolution of the firm and finally vetos against decisions
on the distribution of profits, given either to shareholders or the board .
Also, please note that some veto rights are granted to any shareholder holding more than 25%
of the firm’s equity by law. These are the vetos against changes in the capital structure, against
changes in the shareholder’s agreement and a veto against the dissolution of the firm. Second,
shareholders or the supervisory board13 are entitled to decide about the profit and loss statement
and the subsequent distribution of dividends. Therefore, any party that holds more than 50%
of all votes automatically has a veto right in this matter.
What table 6 clearly reveals is that veto rights do not necessarily increase with the length of
the relationship (i.e. the number of rounds). To the contrary, VCs actually return certain veto
rights to the entrepreneur in later stages of the relationship. Examples for this are the veto
right against changes in the business plan, the veto right against asset sales, and the veto right
against changes in the firm’s head count, as well as veto rights against specific financial decisions.
However, once we consider exit rights it will become clear that this does not necessarily imply
that VCs reduce their influence on the firm. Rather they give up superfluous rights and gain
others that have become valuable to them at this specific point in time.
Table 7 presents the evolution of these veto rights over time periods. The three different time
periods broadly represent the up and down of the market in recent years. We find that by
comparison with the first period, in the third period VCs actually increased the amount of
rights they have in the firm. Interestingly, this increase is also visible in the second period,
where one might have expected to see a decline in the amount of rights held by the VC, due to
13 Note that in contrast to the US and UK, Germany has a two-tier board system: the management board
that comprises all executive directors, and the supervisory board that controls the board of directors. The
supervisory board is elected directly by the shareholders, while the executive directors are elected by the
supervisory board.
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the lower bargaining power of the VC’s at that time14. This implies that learning (or imitation of
the US model) seems to be prevalent in the market15. The increase for certain rights is dramatic,
as in vetos against changes in the shareholder’s agreement and in vetos in the shareholders and
board meetings against profit distributions. Several increases are statistically significant, e.g. the
increased veto rights against financial decisions and the the right to veto changes in the firm’s
head count.
One driving force is the fact that VCs increase their equity stakes in their firms. Table 6 and
table 7 document this. For the veto rights against changes in the firm’s capital structure, the veto
against dissolution of the firm, and the veto rights against changes in the firm’s shareholders’
agreement, the increase in the equity stake indeed causes the increase in veto rights, as all the
aforementioned rights are automatically granted to the VC once his fraction in the firm increases
beyond a certain threshold16.
Table 8 shows the differences in the use of veto rights for different expected contract durations.
Overall, we find that for shorter contract durations more veto rights are employed than for
longer durations. Two exceptions are the veto against financial decisions and the veto against
dissolution of the firm. In these two cases the use of veto rights increases for medium durations,
and finally decreases for very long expected durations.
3.5 Liquidation Rights
Before we present our results for liquidation rights, we provide a short discussion of the relevant
rights. In our sample we can differentiate three types of liquidation rights:
• Debt is characterized by an obligation to pay interest on the sum invested as well as the
requirement to pay back the principal after several years. Normally VCs will not require
interest to be paid out, but will specify the repayment date for the principal ex-ante. Thus
they are effectively granted the right to shut down the firm after a specific period of time.
Also, this claim will be senior to equity claims on the firm’s assets. However, normally the
size of the VC’s debt claim will be small relative to his equity claim.
14 Inderst and Mu¨ller (2002) [32] show that lower bargaining power directly affects the VCs investment behaviour.
15 In the data appendix we control whether our results are driven by changes in the composition of VC types
in the sample. We find that in almost all cases the subsample of independent VCs behaves qualitatively no
different from the complete sample. See below for more on this topic.
16 This threshold is 25% for the veto against changes in the shareholders’ agreement, while it is 50% for decisions
about the firm’s profit distribution.
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• Staging allows the VC to withhold future funding from the firm in case of bad performance.
Thus, the VC will be able to effectively deprive the firm of future funds. However, once
the firm has reached its break even, this threat has partially lost its credibility, as the
entrepreneur will not need to rely on the VC for future funding.
• Put Options allow the VC to demand the repayment of a contractually specified claim
after a pre-defined period of time. In contrast to debt, the repayments need not to be
related to the size of the VC’s investment. However, a put-option does not grant a hard
claim as does debt17.
Table 6 presents some first results with respect to liquidation rights. We find that in 86% VCs
actually have at least some liquidation rights18. Once we consider independent VCs, this fraction
rises to 93%19. The use of liquidation rights is constant over investment rounds. This indicates
the importance of these rights. We see that the use of liquidation rights actually differs across
the three time periods in the market. In the boom period, the second period, the use of these
rights decreases slightly: the use of staging and debt both decline when we compare the first
period to the second period. However, whereas staging is again used more frequently, the use of
debt again declines to only 15% in the third period. Finally, we see that the use of debt increases
for longer expected contract durations, while the use of staging decreases.
Under normal conditions one would conjecture that these liquidation rights are (at least par-
tially) substitutes. Especially, one would expect to find that put-options and debt are used as
substitutes. The same does not need to hold for staging, but one would expect to have at least
a negative correlation between the use of staging and the other two kinds of liquidation rights.
In table 14 we just consider whether these liquidation rights are complements or substitutes for
each other or not. What we can clearly see is the fact that debt-equity mixes, put options and
staging are used together in 26 out of 147 cases, i.e. in roughly 20% of all cases. When straight
debt is used to finance the VC’s investment, we find that in 5 out of 90 cases all three elements
are used in conjunction. Thus, while we do not see that all these rights are used together in each
financing round, we find that for a significant number of observations this is indeed true. Thus
we cannot claim that these rights are used as substitutes only.
17 Bartlett (1995) [4] notes that a judge might not declare an otherwise solvent firm insolvent when a shareholder
exercises a put option that the firm cannot repay.
18 Our variable is the sum of debt and staging. We look at put options separately as we lose quite a bit of
observations when we include put options.
19 For more on the variation of contract elements among different VC types see Hirsch and Walz (2005) [31].
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Table 15 presents the correlations for these three variables. What we find is the following:
While the correlation between put-options and debt usage is negative, it is only slightly so and
statistically not significant. On the other hand, there is a positive significant relationship between
staging and put-options and a negative significant relationship between debt and staging. Again,
we do see that the various liquidation rights do not seem to be strict complements.
3.6 Exit Rights
Owing to one of the main characteristics of venture capital finance, namely the temporary
engagement of VCs in their portfolio firms, the contractual design of the VC’s exit from the
engagement becomes crucial. With a perfect alignment of interest between the VC and the other
owners of the portfolio firm with respect to exit timing and exit channel any covenants regarding
control and decision rights would be superfluous. The same holds true if it were possible to write
complete contracts laying down ex ante any decision in any future state of nature. Clearly the
latter is not feasible. In addition, there are obvious conflicts of interest between the parties. Most
notably these stem from the fact that both parties typically receive non-monetary benefits from
their engagement which are heavily influenced by the exit decision. Entrepreneurs very often
realize control benefits which are asymmetrically affected by the various exit channels. Whereas
in the case of an IPO the entrepreneur typically stays in control, control benefits are lost or at
least reduced in the case of a trade sale. Hence, the entrepreneur will, ceteris paribus, prefer the
IPO to the trade sale. The VC, in contrast, may acquire a reputation gain from a successful
IPO. On the other hand, the VC might also lose reputation should he bring a bad firm onto the
market. Hence, depending on the allocation of the monetary rewards from the exit, conflicts of
interest may arise.
Exit covenants can be interpreted as instruments to resolve these conflicts of interest in such
a way as to enable the ex-post efficient allocation of ownership (and hence the distribution of
monetary and non-monetary benefits) in the firm as well as induce the parties to make ex-ante
efficient investments (see Hart and Moore (1988) [24], Aghion et al. (2004) [2] or Chemla et al.
(2007) [16]). Thus these rights create a mechanism to allocate ownership efficiently.
We can distinguish four different types of covenants related to the exit process20. First, pre-
20 Note that control and decision rights in the case of a liquidation (which can also be interpreted as an exit) are
completely different with respect to their economic role but also with respect to the situations to which they
apply. Therefore we treated them in the previous section. Also put-options in combination with VC seniority
could force the entrepreneur to accept the VC’s exit choice (Bartlett (1995) [4]). However, in this chapter we
focus on the explicit rights, not on the outcome of possible renegotiation.
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emption rights (which might be assigned to either party) forces one of the parties, in the
case its being willing to sell its stake to an outside investor, to offer the shares to the other
shareholders, at ”fair value”, often interpreted as the price the outside investor is willing to
pay. Second, take (tag)-along clauses21 preclude that one of the parties sell its shares to an
outside investor without giving the other shareholders the chance to follow suit as well. Rather,
the take-along clause gives the other shareholders the right to include their shares in the sale
at the same price as the one offered to the initial party. Third, we observe drag-along clauses
which give the outside investor, who has achieved a deal with one shareholder, the right to buy
the other shareholders’ stakes at the same price and the same terms22. Basically, this avoids an
exit being held up by one party as long as one shareholder has the possibility to sell its stake
to an outside investor. Fourth, piggy back rights allow each party to include its share in an
initial public offering in proportion to its stakes in the firm. Thereby, the exclusion from an IPO
can be avoided.
Table 5 displays the main elements of the exit rights prevailing in our data set. First, we should
note that sale rights, in contrast to IPO rights, show up in a significant number of contracts.
The ones which are most interesting from our perspective (preemption rights, drag and take
along rights) can be observed in a range of one to two thirds of all cases. The use of IPO rights
seems to be, however, quite limited (below three percent of all cases).
Comparing the exit rights across our three time dimensions reveals interesting insights. The
most challenging observation stems without doubt from the comparison of the usage of the exit
right instruments across the different rounds and the closeness of the exit point. With respect
to the different rounds we find statistically significant increases of the usage of most sale rights
across the different financing rounds (see Table 6). The same is true with respect to the IPO
rights. The only exception to this general picture is the entrepreneur’s preemption right which is
increasing from round to round but not to a significant extent. Overall, this implies that whereas
other control rights may be handed back to the entrepreneur across the different rounds this is
definitely not true for the exit rights in our sample. The differences across rounds are not only
statistically significant but also show rather pronounced difference in the level of control which
shifts to the VC.
Interestingly, the relatively high number of pre-emption rights (42% in third rounds, 46% when
21 The name tag-along seems to be more common in the US. In Germany, take-along is used more often.
22 Drag-along clauses often (but not always) depend upon a qualifying majority of 50% or 75% of all equity
holders agreeing on such a decision. For simplicity we will abstract from this in the following analysis.
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the VC’s exit is expected to be close) given to entrepreneurs shows that the contracting parties
seem to be concerned about the VC’s potential to abuse his strong position in the exit process.
This is also consistent with Chemla et al. (2007) [16], who show that in case of a hold-up these
exit-rights should be used.
Very much the same pattern can be observed with respect to the expected time to exit. The closer
the expected exit the more prevalent the usage of exit rights. The differences are pronounced and
statistically significant between short (one to three year) and medium (four to six year) expected
contract durations. This reflects the increasing importance of exit rights with investments which
are due closely for exit. Besides the change in the level of these control rights, the absolute levels
are worth noting. For short expected-exit periods we find exit rights for the VC in the majority
of all contracts. Aghion et al. (2004) [2] note that exit rights should be given to the VC in case
he wants to hold a more liquid stake. Clearly, if the VC wants to exit soon, he will require more
exit rights.
Surprisingly at first glance, our univariate statistics also display a clear-cut pattern in our third
time dimension, namely calendar time. Over time, i.e. over our three periods (first period until
1997, second period: 1998-2000 and third period lasting from 2001-2004) our data displays a
significant increase in the usage of the exit rights and hence indicates some signs of a learning
process. This means starting in a rather new and developing VC market, VCs initially did not
employ exit right instruments. Over time, corresponding to the diffusion of knowledge about US
contracting practices, VCs in the German market seem to have learned about the benefits of
contractual design and in particular about the importance of exit rights.
One might conjecture that this learning process does not reflect learning at the level of the
individual VC, but rather a change of the composition of the VC pool in the different periods
shifting from public and bank-oriented German style funds to more independent and more
international funds. A first indication that the learning process actually did take place and was
not overshadowed by the changing composition of the VC pool stems from the fact that running
the same exercise for the independent VCs revealed the same picture as in Table 623.
3.7 Other rights
Anti-competition clauses are frequently found even for very early contracts. However, their usage
increases from 50% to about 94% in the third time period. The same is true when we consider
23 Please note that the corresponding table can be found in the web appendix.
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financing rounds: There, usage increases from 70% to about 83%. However, these results are
not statistically significant, whereas they are when considering time periods. Also, VCs seem to
be more worried about this issue closer to exit, as documented in table 8. The importance of
these rights is emphasized by the analysis of Hart and Moore (1994) [26] and Neher (1999) [37].
Both show that if the entrepreneur’s human capital is important, the VC faces hold-up from the
entrepreneur. Therefore the VC has to take this into account when designing the contract. By
taking the entrepreneur the opportunity to work for competitors or setting up his own firm for
at least one year, the VC can partially mitigate this threat.
Exactly the same pattern is true with anti-dilution protection for the VC. However, the increases
are more pronounced and begin at lower levels. Here, the VCs rights increase from 23% in the
first round to 55% in the third round. Also, VCs used these clauses only in about 2% of all
financing rounds initially, but increased their stake to 58% in the third period.
3.8 Separation of Cash-Flow and Control Rights
Before we turn to a multivariate analysis of the issues considered above, we analyze the potential
separation of cash flow and control rights (other than voting rights). Cash flow and voting rights
often move closely together as shown above. Hence, the separation of cash flow and control
rights, as documented by Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) [33], can, in our sample, only take place
via the above mentioned operational and veto rights. Table 9 documents that this is indeed the
case.
In the table we show how veto rights vary with the VC’s cash flow rights. The strongest evidence
comes from the first column where VCs holding debt-like claims in their firms already possess
an impressive amount of veto rights. Almost all can veto changes in the shareholder’s agreement
(85%), although they do not hold equity at all. 37% hold veto rights against changes in the firm’s
headcount, and 44% can block changes in the firm’s lines of business. However, even for VCs
that hold a fraction of the firms equity it is clear that cash flow and control rights are allocated
separately. This means these VCs hold more veto rights than mandated by German commercial
law. For example, 64% of all VCs that have equity stakes lower than 25% are allowed to veto
changes in the capital structure of the firm, albeit this right is mandatory only for owners of
more than 25% of the firm’s equity. Indeed, 63% of all VCs that hold between 50% to 75% of a
firm’s equity are allowed to veto against certain financial decisions (i.e. hedging decisions or FX
operations). This again indicates the separate allocation of control and voting rights.
Also, the separation of cash flows and control is documented by the fact that in 18% of all cases
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VCs even have the right to replace the firm’s management. This right increases from 12% in the
first financing round to 38% in the third and from 3% in the first period to 32% in the third
period24. In the US, VCs also have similar types of rights, as shown by Hellmann (1998) [28].
3.9 Robustness
We run several robustness checks for our descriptive results. These tables can be found in the
web appendix. These include the repetition of our analysis for round finance for those firms that
reach a third round only (table 1 in the web appendix). The idea behind this reasoning is that
there might be a survivorship bias introduced by those firms that make it to the third round.
However, all of our previous findings are confirmed when looking at the data in this way.
Second, we only consider firms for which additional rounds are expected (table 2 in the web
appendix). The idea is that while looking at firms where third rounds are realized might account
for survivors, this might also truncate the sample. Again, our findings are confirmed in the data.
Finally, in order to see whether our findings are driven by learning only, we look at all those
firms for which a first or third (or higher) financing round was completed in the years after 2001
(table 3 in the web appendix). The reason behind this finding is that if learning had taken place,
its main impact should have been after the crash period starting after spring 2000. However,
while we indeed observe a level effect for a lot of variables (i.e. drag-along and take-along rights),
the basic results stay the same: there is a significant increase of exit rights over rounds. That is,
firms whose first round was financed in or after 2001 have fewer exit rights attached than firms
that completed a third round during the same period.
Finally in table 4 in the web appendix we control whether the mix of VCs drives our results by
only looking at Independent VCs. However, our findings are reconfirmed here as well
In table 5 of the web appendix we look at whether the entry of more sophisticated investors
influences our results. While there is base a effect, our findings remain unchanged. Second, we
check whether learning is driven by the increase in rights over rounds only. For this we proceed
to consider only first rounds by independent VCs for all three periods. Again, we can rule out
this hypothesis.
Finally, in table 7 we check whether our definition of the expected contract duration influences
our results25. However, the definition of our variable does not seem to influence results.
24 Note that this is right independent of the fact whether the VC holds more than 50% of the firm’s voting rights
and could therefore change management even without this right.
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The extent to which these first indications from our univariate statistics survive a multivariate
analysis has to be seen in the subsequent regression analysis and will form the next section of
our paper.
4 Multivariate Analysis
In this section we extend our results from the last section by relating the choice of contractual
mechanisms to observable characteristics of the firm and the VC. We thereby have two objectives.
The first one is to ensure that our findings from the last section survive a multivariate analysis.
Secondly, we attempt to look into further determinants of control rights allocations and relate
these findings to existing theory.
In the following we provide a brief discussion of the main theoretical mechanisms in order to
address our second objective.
4.1 Main theoretical mechanisms
In this subsection we will outline the main economic mechanisms of existing theoretical ap-
proaches which try to explain control right allocations. We will limit the discussion to aspects
which are relevant for our empirical analysis. The theoretical literature on corporate finance and
governance stresses a number of key mechanisms. These mechanisms provide different potential
explanations for the allocation of decision and control rights among the various agents. Decision
and control rights may serve
• as a substitute for pledgeable income,
• as insurance for specific investments,
• as a signalling device, or
• as a information acquisition device.
In the following we outline the main hypotheses behind these mechanisms. The task of opera-
tionalizing them is then left to our discussion of our multivariate findings.
25 We eliminate all observations for firms where we observe debt finance only and have no information about the
exit horizon.
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The first mechanism focuses on the role of DCRs in the interaction between cash-flow rights and
private benefits (see most notably Aghion/Bolton (1992) [1], Bolton/Scharfstein (1990) [11],
Hart/Moore (1994) [26], and (1998) [27]). These papers consider control rights as substitutes for
limited pledgable cash flows. These rights may resolve the potential conflicts between monetary
and non-monetary benefits and interests arising from the involvement with the firm. The basic
idea is to replenish the participation constraint of the investor in the case of lacking or unverifiable
monetary returns with decision and control rights. This approach neglects issues of asymmetric
information and hence yields no prediction about the influence of asymmetric information.
The main question therefore turns out to be: what factors determine a potential lack of pledgeable
income? One important aspect of the existence of pledgeable income is a strong balance sheet
(e.g. one with a high degree of fixed assets which may serve as collateral). This would allow
the entrepreneur to put up collateral rather than use (the inefficient currency) DCRs. The same
effect stems from the higher initial wealth of the entrepreneur relative to the VC’s investment. In
addition, we would expect from this approach that a higher degree of uncertainty is associated
with less pledgeable income streams and hence leads to a higher probability that the VC’s
participation constraint is not binding in the absence of DCRs.
The second mechanism is stressed in models which form the theory-of-the-firm literature (see
e.g. Grossman/Hart (1986) [22], Hart/Moore (1990) [25], and Hart (1995) [23]). This literature
considers decision and control rights as instruments that ensure efficient ex-ante investments by
solving or at least mitigating hold-up problems. In general terms this implies that the higher the
degree of uncertainty the more valuable are DCRs. The special aspect of the relationship between
the VC and the entrepreneur is, however, that the potential hold-up works in both directions.
Both the entrepreneur as well as the VC are potentially engaged in the entrepreneurial firm with
relation-specific investments and hence, may both face a hold-up problem. Therefore, if DCRs
are used as measures to mitigate hold-up problems, the allocation of these rights between the
entrepreneur and the VC is determined by the relative importance and severity of the hold-up
problem. Or, to put it differently: the allocation of decision and control rights in the hands of
the VC is more pronounced the more important the hold-up problem of the VC is relative to
that of the entrepreneur. If DCRs act as an insurance for non-contractible specific investments
it is efficient to allocate a larger proportion of DCRs to the party which contributes most to the
relationship.
The third mechanism has recently been advanced by Dessein (2004) [17]. Here, the main idea
is, that in the presence of pronounced informational asymmetries between the entrepreneur and
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the investor, the entrepreneur may signal his quality by offering many DCRs to the investor.
Signalling with DCRs is more important the more pronounced the conflict of interests between
the VC and the entrepreneur is and the more pronounced the informational gap between the
entrepreneur and the VC is. Controlling for the observed quality of the entrepreneur, using DCRs
as a signal implies that we should observe more DCRs being offered to the VC when a higher
degree of uncertainty exists. The better the observed quality of the entrepreneur the lower is the
signalling value of DCRs. Hence, we would expect repeated (successful) entrepreneurs to offer
fewer DCRs to the VC: signalling with DCRs is less attractive if the entrepreneur has proven
his ability already somewhere else. Another testable hypothesis of the signalling interpretation
of DCRs is that the level of DCRs allocated to the VC increases in the degree of asymmetric
information. In addition, this approach implies that tangible assets which may serve as collateral,
and hence dampen the agency problem, reduce the need of signalling via DCRs.
Aghion/Tirole (1997) [3] consider the distribution of real versus formal authority in firms and
decision making. The retention of formal control rights protects the VC when the two parties’
interests potentially collide, while the allocation of formal control to the entrepreneur increases
the incentives for information acquisition. Thus control rights allow an optimal allocation of
authority when information acquisition matters and interests potentially diverge. Hence, this
view predicts a negative relationship between the degree of asymmetric information and the
level of DCRs allocated towards the VC. This implies that we have two competing hypothesis
we regard to the relationship of asymmetric information and the level of control rights.
4.2 Operational Rights
In a first step, we want to consider the determinants for the use of certain operational control
rights. We concentrate our analysis on the variable VETO RIGHTS. VETO RIGHTS themselves
can be split into two subcategories: OPERATIONAL VETO RIGHTS that give the VC the right
to block certain actions proposed by management. These include vetos against changes in the
firm’s business plan, a veto against changes in the firm’s headcount, against financial decisions
and several other veto rights that comprise the category termed others. On the other hand,
STRUCTURAL VETO RIGHTS are those that protect the VC’s investment in the firm and are
also those that are regulated by German Commercial Law26. Table 12 presents regressions that
aim at explaining the use of these rights. All models report results for ordered probit regressions
26 There are two different codes for public firms with limited liability and for private firms with limited liability,
the AktG and the GmbHG.
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for all rounds in the sample with standard errors clustered at firm level.
The regressions confirm the findings of the univariate analysis. In our base model the variables
PERIOD1 and PERIOD3 are significant and the signs of the coefficient indicate learning over
time. The usage of the veto rights overall as well as of the structural and operational veto rights
increase over time. In table 13 we replace FINISHED PRODUCT by AGE. These variables
turned out to be the development stage indicators which are least correlated with the other right-
hand side variables. The pattern we stressed in our univariate analysis also holds in our base
model with respect to the ROUND variable. Operational rights which have become superfluous
over the relationship of the VC and the portfolio firms are returned to the entrepreneur. Whereas
this effect is significant for operational rights, the negative coefficient of the ROUND variable is
insignificant for the structural veto rights.
If we plug in additional explanatory variables (see models 2, 4, and 6) the above effects become
weaker for the learning variables. This is due to the fact that some of these variables are cor-
related with the period dummies. For instance, we observe an increase of the number of repeat
entrepreneurs over time (see tables 10 and 11). However, inserting these additional variables
allows us to look into the explanatory power of the theoretical mechanisms discussed above. We
use the fixed asset ratio (FAR) and AUDITED BALANCE SHEET as proxies for the pledgeable
income/asset mechanism according to Aghion and Bolton (1992) [1]. Whereas the former vari-
able is basically irrelevant for our observed allocation of veto rights, the AUDITED BALANCE
SHEET variable provides some support for this mechanism. With an audited balance sheet, in-
come and assets become more verifiable (more pledgeable income) and hence require less control
rights for the VC. The negative coefficient (which is significant for the overall VETO RIGHT
variable) confirms this relationship.
In contrast, the variable which we constructed in order to measure the relative extent of the VC’s
hold-up problem (VC EXPERT * EARLY STAGE) does not reveal any significant influence of
the specific investment mechanism on the allocation of veto rights. In contrast, the variable
which we constructed in order to measure the relative extent of the VC’s hold-up problem (VC
EXPERT * EARLY STAGE) does not reveal any significant explanatory power of the specific
investment mechanism for the allocation of veto rights. We observe in two of the three cases the
expected positive sign but the coefficient is completely insignificant. The variable AGE, which
we use as a proxy for the degree of uncertainty (older firms have survived longer and have thus
proved to be more viable, the future of the firm becomes much more predictable), should have
negative coefficients. This is the case in all but one specification, but none of the coefficients is
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significant. This reemphasizes our findings.
With respect to the signalling mechanism our regressions reveal mixed findings. The REPEAT
ENTREPRENEUR variable has a significantly negative impact on the allocation of operational
rights. This indicates that for repeat entrepreneurs the adverse selection problem is less pro-
nounced implying less need to signal with operational control rights.
We construct PERIOD2*EARLY STAGE, an interactive dummy. We thereby aim to test the
signalling mechanism, as we expect that early stage firms had a need to signal their type es-
pecially during the boom period (PERIOD2). In particular, we would expect a positive and
significant effect if signalling matters. The regressions show, however, almost the reverse. This
could either be interpreted against the signalling approach or might simply be due to the fact
that in this period signalling was too expensive given the high proportion of bad firms in the
market.
As has been outlined in the previous subsection the different mechanisms lead to different predic-
tions of the effect of asymmetric information on the allocation of control rights. Using FINISHED
PRODUCT as an indicator for asymmetric information (younger firms are more opaque than
older ones) points towards the signalling hypothesis, as all signs have the right direction. However
none of the coefficients is significant.
Summing up we saw our findings from the univariate analysis confirmed in our multivariate
regressions. With respect to the economic mechanism potentially being able to explain the
allocation of operation rights we find some evidence for the pledgeable income mechanism a` la
Aghion and Bolton (1992) [1]. With respect to the signalling approach the result is mixed. In
addition, we could not find any support for the specific investment mechanism.
One should stress, however, the obvious: all this has to be seen against the background that we
obviously do have only imperfect proxies which also do leave some room for discussion. This
caveat holds true for the analysis in the following subsections. Despite this we think that given
the abstract model and the limitation of data sets our proxies do depict the underlying variables
as closely as possible.
4.3 Liquidation Rights
Regression results are given in table 17. We proceed in two steps. First, we run ordered probit
regressions with the dependent variable being the number of liquidation rights given to the VC
in the particular financing round. This means our endogenous variable is the sum of the dummy
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for debt, staging and the put-option dummy. Thereby, we distinguish between our base model
and an extended model in which we include the proxies for the economic mechanism we want
to look at. In the base cases we use rather similar specifications as in the previous subsection.
In a second step, we exclude the debt variable and look only into staging and put options as
liquidation rights27. Therefore, we want to ask under which circumstances other liquidation rights
have been used. In all the regression we find no significant influence of the ROUND variable. In
other words the allocation of liquidation rights does not change structurally over the lifetime of
the relationship between the VC and the portfolio firm. With respect to time periods we find a
significant increase in the usage of staging and put options between periods 2 and 3. From an
overall point of view this is, however, superimposed by the fact that debt has decreased over
time. This means that for liquidation rights we find some support for our learning hypothesis.
We also find evidence that VCs start increasing the separation of cash-flow and control rights
by decreasing the use of debt and increasing the use of alternative liquidation rights.
When we look at the variables that can be related to the economic mechanisms behind the
allocation of liquidation rights three main findings become obvious. First, the variable which
depicts a proxy for the degree of asymmetric information (FINISHED PRODUCT) is highly
significant in the base regression. This is in line with the prediction of the signalling mechanism.
In addition, the negative and significant coefficient of BALANCE SHEET SIZE variable in
the overall regression together with the insignificant result for the second type of regression
(excluding debt) indicates that especially debt is used as a liquidation right for smaller firms.
Also, the more pronounced the degree of uncertainty (the younger the firm, i.e. the lower AGE)
the more liquidation rights are allocated towards the VC, thereby providing support for the
specific investment mechanism. Both variables indicate that liquidation rights might be used in
firms that are more financially constrained, thus finding evidence for the Aghion and Bolton
(1992) [1] model.
Thirdly, we have employed RESEARCH DEGREE as a proxy for the specific human capital
of the entrepreneur. Hart and Moore (1994) [26] argue that inalienable human capital of the
entrepreneur that is essential to the firm leads to a potential hold-up problem. The reason for
27 The reason for this is twofold. First, we consider debt to be a rather crude liquidation right since it does not
address other incentive and control problems if the firm is doing well. Second, debt also has features that go
beyond its function as a liquidation right, e.g. being a sharing rule between the entrepreneur and the VC for
any surplus created by the firm. Recent research into the capital structure of VC firms has shown that debt
in its function as a security seems to be suboptimal (See among others Bascha & Walz (2001) [6], Casamatta
(2003) [15], Dessi (2003) [18], Schmidt (2003) [40], and Hellmann (2006) [29].) This approach thus allows us
to disentangle two opposing effects when considering liquidation rights, the decrease in the use of debt and
any corresponding increase in staging and put options.
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this is that the entrepreneur cannot commit himself not to withdraw his human capital from
the firm. They show that a debt contract may resolve this problem. This argument has been
extended by Neher (1999) [37] to staged financing. The positive and significant coefficient of our
RESEARCH DEGREE variable points in this direction.
All other variables turn out to have no significant effect on the allocation of liquidation rights.
This implies that we do not find further support for the signalling mechanism, since in particular
the REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR variable is insignificant in all specifications.
4.4 Exit Rights
In the regression analysis we focus on trade-sale rights and leave the analysis of IPO rights
aside. A glance at table 16 clearly confirms the hypothesis on the relative importance of IPO vs.
trade-sale rights. While we observe trade-sale rights in a very substantial number of cases and
with respect to some trade-sale rights even in the majority of cases, the usage of IPO rights is
much less pronounced. Only in very few transactions have we seen the usage of IPO rights in the
actual contracts. This in line with Bascha/Walz (2001) [5] and Hellmann (2006) [29] who focus
on the choices of the exit mode and potential conflicts of interest. Their main argument is that
due to the more pronounced asymmetries in non-monetary benefits in the case of a trade sale
(most notably there, the entrepreneur loses much of his control benefits) the conflict of interest
between the VC and the entrepreneur is more pronounced in the case of a trade sale compared
to an IPO. This implies that we should observe significantly more trade sale exit rights than
IPO exit rights.
For the trade-sale rights we use two types of specifications. In a first step, we analyze the
determinants of all trade-sale rights. We add up drag-along, take-along clauses, and other specific
trade-sale rights (the information duty dummy, an anti-dilution protection dummy, and the
existence of a VC preemption right). In a second step, we concentrate on the two most important
rights, take-along and drag-along clauses. In both steps we use the same regression specification.
These specifications are rather similar to the ones employed in the two previous sections. We
only add some variables to test exit-specific theories. In addition, rather than using all industry
dummies we take into account that in some industries these trade-sale rights are always or never
used. In order to avoid the resulting econometric problems we use the growth industry variable
as an industry control which allows for some variation among the firms. Regression results are
displayed in Tables 18-20.
The learning hypothesis, indicating increasing convergence to US style contracts (with respect
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to trade-sale rights) is verified by the various specifications and for the various sales rights (see
tables 18-20). The PERIOD1 and PERIOD3 dummy variable always have a negative and positive
sign respectively, indicating learning over time. This effect is, in particular, significant for the
third period and exists even when we control for VC types. Hence, we clearly find that over time
VCs have relied more and more on sales rights as a mean to ensure efficient exit decisions and
to avoid inefficiencies due to hold-up problems and ex-post renegotiations.
This supports, at least with respect to control and decision rights, the arguments of Kaplan et al.
(2006) [35] that in the long-run, despite all differences in the legal and institutional framework,
a convergence towards US style contracts can be observed.
Most notable, our data clearly reveal that the usage of sales rights increases with the length of
the relationship between the VC and the entrepreneur. The ROUND variable is always positive
and statistically significant (often at the 1 percent level). Hence, in later financing rounds, sales
rights are increasingly allocated to the VC, thereby refuting the notion that the decision and
control rights are shifted away from the VC during the relationship between the VC and the
entrepreneur. Our analysis clearly shows that this notion is true for operational control rights
but not for exit rights. For the latter exactly the reverse is true. Therefore, our analysis stresses
the importance of looking not only at the aggregate allocation of decision and control rights but
at the disaggregated structure as well. Our findings are in line with Bolton and Faure-Grimaud
(2006) [10] who argue in a bounded-rationality set-up that individuals have an incentive to
prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event
when they arise. This explains why exit rights are included in the contract only in later stages,
despite the fact that the VC could foresee that potential exit provisions are needed later on in
the relationship.
With our regression analysis we also want to shed some empirical light on recent theoretical
work dealing with exit right provisions in detail. Most notably, Aghion et al. (2005) [2] analyze
the choice of contract and security design against the background of the trade off between the
need for monitoring and the demand for liquidity. In their model exit rights are chosen in order
to guarantee that the VC can satisfy his desire for liquidity in the case of an exit and make
sure that an exit actually takes place. Having explicit exit rights is more likely if the VC lacks
majority voting rights via the security design. Using a different set-up in which exit rights take
the role of ensuring efficient ex-ante investment and preventing ex-post renegotiation and hold-
up problems Chemla et al (2005) [16] also predict that more exit rights are used if the VC
lacks a majority of voting rights. They also explicitly justify take-along, drag-along as well as
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IPO rights on these grounds. In their approach, these problems are more pronounced the more
uncertain the entire venture is, the more pronounced the specificity of the investment and the
weaker the bargaining position of the VC in the case of a exit. Hence, in these cases we should
expect to observe more exit rights.
In addition, using the arguments of Chemla et al. we should observe a close link between the
expectations on the exit mode and the respective exit right. In other words in cases where
the VC expects an IPO, piggy back and demand rights are more likely to be included in the
contract, whereas with an expected trade sale the respective trade-sale rights are employed.
This link between the expected exit mode and the distribution of exit rights can also be derived
from the Aghion/Tirole (1997) argument of control rights serving as an information acquisition
mechanism. This model predicts that the VCs should be given exit rights, as the entrepreneur
will not have any incentive to search for potential trade buyers of the firm. Typically, a sale
of the firm decreases the entrepreneur’s private benefits. On the other hand, a trade sale may
actually be more profitable than an IPO, as shown in Bienz (2005) [8]. Thus, the VC actually
has incentives to search for such a potential buyer and should be given these rights in cases in
which the monetary gains exceed the gains from control benefits. In contrast to this, in case of
an IPO the potential for conflicts of interests between both parties is low and therefore no such
rights should be necessary. Again, this implies that we should observe significantly more trade
sale exit rights than exit rights for the IPO case. Second, it implies that when a trade sale is
expected, one would expect to see specific trade sale covenants for the VC.
Our regression analysis partially confirms this view. We clearly find that with an expected trade
sale more exit rights are allocated towards the VC. The variable TRADE SALE EXPECTED has
the expected positive and significant coefficient in all specifications. Interpreting AGE as a proxy
for uncertainty we also find some support for the specific investment explanation of Chemla et
al. (2005). In contrast, however, the relationship between VC MAJORITY and exit rights is
just the reverse to the one predicted by their analysis. The variable always has a positive and
significant coefficient. One potential reason for this is a legal one: courts might be quite reluctant
to enforce the rights of VCs if they are minority shareholders. Therefore, these rights are only
enforceable for VCs holding a majority of votes.
The other variables have basically no effect on the allocation of exit rights. Hence, our results
indicate that with respect to exit rights the pledgeable income mechanism as well as the signalling
approach do not seem to play a role. This is in a sense not surprising because the lack of
pledgablility of income and the adverse selection problem should be significantly less pronounced
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with firms for which the exit decision is relevant.
4.5 Brief Summary
In the previous three sections we looked into the impact of the various time dimensions on the
allocation of control rights and investigated several mechanisms that aim at explaining the use
of control rights in entrepreneurial firms. What we found was that while none of the theories
can be rejected on the outright, some theories seem to have more explanatory power for specific
types of control rights. Indeed, with respect to operational rights most evidence points towards
the Aghion/Bolton theory of control rights. This theory considers control rights as a way of
fulfilling the VC’s participation constraint in case the entrepreneur lacks pledgable income.
Dessein’s signalling approach is also able to explain some broad features of the allocation of
control rights, but the evidence for this approach is less compelling than for the Aghion/Bolton
type mechanism.
In the case of exit rights, hedging specific investments and avoiding hold-up problems seems
to play a crucial role. There, interpreting exit rights as substitutes for monetary income or as
a signalling device seems to play less of a role. Interestingly, we find that the exit problem is
addressed only when it becomes more pressing, thereby pointing in the direction of the bounded
rationality argument put forward by Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2006) [10].
5 Alternative Explanations for Learning
In this section we consider alternative explanation to the learning hypothesis and we will discuss
why we think that learning seems to be the best explanation for our findings.
5.1 Market Power & Market Conditions
In our discussion above, we interpreted the observed changes in contract design over the three
time periods as a learning process. One obvious alternative hypothesis is a change in market
conditions and a related change in the bargaining position of the VC relative to the entrepreneur.
So, why do we think that market conditions do not explain our findings? If the large inflows into
venture capital during the years 1999 and 2000 were to be the cause28, then in our descriptive
statistics we would expect that we should observe a temporary decline in the use of control
28 See data from the German Venture Capital Association (BVK) (2006) [19].
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rights during the boom period (period 2 in our tables). We do not observe this effect for any
of our control rights except for the use of staging. The same is true for our regressions: We
would expect the signs of both period dummies to be positive if market conditions would be the
determining factor. Again, we find this result in none of the regressions we run.
One could also argue that exit market conditions might be driving the results for the sale rights
we observe. Again, if this were to be the case, one would expect a decrease in the use of sale
rights for the second period. Exit market conditions in the second period were favorable for
IPOs29, so there was less need to include trade-sale rights. Despite this, we observe a continuous
increase in the use of trade-sale rights and the differences are statistically significant.
5.2 Changes in the type of securities used
Another candidate to rationalize the changes in contract design over time periods are the related
changes in the financial securities chosen. Or to put it differently: are the observed changes the
consequence of a change in the use of securities over time? We think that indeed this is the
case. However, if this is the case, this would reemphasize our learning hypothesis. All theoretical
papers on security design in venture capital30 suggest that debt finance is an inefficient form of
financing compared to convertibles or debt-equity mixes. Therefore, if learning is taking place,
one would expect a shift away from debt finance towards equity finance. However, a shift from
debt to equity type instruments would also require the use of additional control rights, such
as more staging, put options and liquidation preferences. Why would we expect this? Debt is
normally a bundle of cash-flow and control rights in the sense that debt allows the VC the right
to close the firm and provides him with seniority for his investment. Therefore, the joint increase
in the use of liquidation preferences together with the increase in the use of staging and put
options (as documented in table 7) is indeed strong evidence for the learning hypothesis.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the evolution of control rights over time. We draw a random sample from
a base population that covers approximately 60% of the German VCmarket from 1991-2003. This
yields a broad and representative sample of 290 VC firms with 464 investment rounds. Within
29 See Deutsche Bo¨rse (2006) [12].
30 See among others Bascha & Walz (2001) [6], Casamatta (2003) [15], Dessi (2003) [18], Schmidt (2003) [40],
and Hellmann (2006) [29].
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this sample we analyze VC behavior. We think that our paper makes four main contributions
to the existing literature.
First, we find that investor control rights do not necessarily decrease with the length of the
relationship. With respect to certain decisions, the VC’s formal control rights actually increase.
Indeed, we show that the closer the expected exit decision the more probable clauses related to
the expected exit channel become. Thus, we expand the analysis found in Kaplan and Stro¨mberg
(2003 [33], 2004 [34]) as we investigate the use of exit clauses.
Second, we show that learning in venture capital contracts takes place on a broad basis. We
make use of a long time series of contracts from 1990 to 2004. What seems to be the case is
that VC contracts converge towards their US counterparts. We are therefore able to reconcile
the differing findings of Kaplan et al. (2005) [35] and Lerner/Schoar (2004) [36].
A third (methodological) innovation with respect to the aforementioned papers is our use of
the expected contract duration and the expected exit choice. Kaplan et al. 2004 [34] show
the usefulness of expected risk measures for the allocation of control rights. We expand their
framework to include expected exit choice and expected contract duration and find both of them
to be an important factor influencing contract design.
Fourth, we show that our data is in line with prior research papers that predict the use of control
rights in financial contracts. The most relevant theories seem to be the Aghion/Bolton theory of
control rights, Dessein’s signalling approach to control rights and the hold-up explanation put
forward by Hart and Moore among others.
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Appendix A: Data Description
In what follows, we will describe the data set in more detail and introduce the variables necessary
for our regressions.
Firm Characteristics
First of all, we have information about the project and the respective portfolio company. The
variable AGE represents the age of the firm when the corresponding financing round was closed.
The variable FINISHED PRODUCT indicates whether the firm has a product that can be
sold. Moreover, we observe the firm’s industry: LIFE-SCIENCE, INTERNET, IT/TELECOM,
TRADITIONAL HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES and OTHER INDUSTRIES are all dummy vari-
ables that indicate the project’s industry. The dummy GROWTH INDUSTRIES is a variable
that indicates whether the firm’s industry is research intensive, that is whether it is a biotech,
IT/telecoms or a traditional high-tech firm. Furthermore, we observe the firm’s development
stage in each financing round. On the one hand, we know whether the firm has finished its
product tests, if it already has a finished product, if the firm holds any patents or if it even has
reference customers. On the other hand, we have information about the development stages as
defined by the German Venture Capital Association. We distinguish seed and start-up firms and
expansion and later stage firms: the dummy EARLY STAGE indicates whether the firm belongs
to the first group (dummy equals one) or not (dummy equals zero). Furthermore, we often have
the firms’ balance sheet data at the date of each financing round: we know if the firm has any
revenues (if this is the case the dummy REVENUES takes value one) and whether its balance
sheet is audited or not (if this is the case the dummy AUDITED BALANCE SHEET takes value
one). We also know the size of the firm’s balance sheet. Moreover, the FIXED ASSET RATIO
(FAR) indicates the ratio of fixed assets to balance sheet total whereby we use balance sheet
data of the year preceding the year of closing of the corresponding financing round31. Finally, we
know if the portfolio company has received funding from other investors apart from the VC we
are looking at. We define a dummy OUTSIDE FINANCE that takes value one if the portfolio
company has received bank, angel or other VC finance before the first round of VC financing
we are looking at or if VC financing takes place via a syndicate of various VCs.
31 As we have many missing values in our sample, we adopt the following procedure. For all firms in a first
financing round with an age of less than one year at the date of contracting and an investment phase of seed
or early, we set the fixed asset ratio to zero. If we lack information for higher rounds, we use the same ratio
as in the round before. If this ratio is not available, we code both as missing value. Additionally, we do not
resort to the preceding round in the case of second rounds where we coded the first round data to be zero.
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Last but not least, we have information about the entrepreneurs running the portfolio firm.
We know whether we face a repeat entrepreneur, i.e. if any of the founders has already run
a firm (this is captured by the dummy variable REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR). We also know
whether any of the founders has a background in engineering, which we code as SCIENCE
BACKGROUND. If any of the founders has a PhD or a degree above32, we code the variable
RESEARCH DEGREE to take value one.
Investment Conditions
Second, we have information, about the investment conditions. We classify each VC according to
his type into three categories named INDEPENDENT VC, PUBLIC VC and OTHER VCs. The
latter category includes both bank(-dependent) and corporate VCs33. Additionally, we know
whether the VC’s are specialized in specific industries or development stages. Moreover, we ob-
serve the total amount invested, the financing instrument used and the timing of the investment.
The STAGING dummy captures whether the project is financed in several steps or not.
Also, we observe the year when the financing round is closed and define three time dummies.
PERIOD1 takes value one if the financing round was closed during the early period of relatively
low venture capital activity, namely before 1998, PERIOD2 if it was closed during the boom, i.e.
between 1998 and 2000 and PERIOD3 if it was closed after 2000 - a period of relative decline
and reorganization of the venture capital industry.
Voting and Control Rights
Most important of all we know the amount of voting rights the VC holds. We code this as VOT-
ING RIGHTS/CASH-FLOW RIGHTS. We repeat the same exercise for the amount of voting
rights the VC has on the firm’s board: BOARD VOTING RIGHTS. VC VOTING MAJORITY
and BOARD MAJORITY are dummy variables that take value one if the VC has a majority
in either the firm’s shareholder meeting or on the firm’s board. Finally, we measure the degree
of supermajority provisions by looking at the REQUIRED DECISION MAJORITY and the
BOARD REQUIRED MAJORITY. Our previous measures for the VCs majorities take these
into account.
Of course, we observe the types of control rights used in the firm: VETO RIGHTS is the sum of
the following veto rights: OPERATIONAL VETO RIGHTS, STRUCTURAL VETO RIGHTS,
32 In Germany, this means doctoral degrees, a Habilitation, a Privatdozent or a professorship.
33 We also include the business angels in our sample in this category.
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VETO ASSET SALES, and the two veto rights against profit distribution, both for the board
and for shareholders. OPERATIONAL VETO RIGHTS is the sum of the veto rights that govern
the entrepreneur’s actions in the firm: a veto against changes in the firm’s line of business, a
veto right against certain financial decisions such as capital expenditures or the use of derivative
instruments, a veto right against changes in the firm’s head count and veto’s against other
decisions, i.e. against lawsuits on behalf of the firm. STRUCTURAL VETO RIGHTS is the
sum of the veto rights that secure the VC’s position in the firm: A veto right against changes in
the shareholders’ agreement, a veto that forbids the firm’s dissolution and a veto against changes
in the firm’s capital structure such as giving out new shares. Often the shareholders have a veto
right against the use of the firm’s profit.
LIQUIDATION RIGHTS is the sum of a debt dummy and the STAGING dummy. We also
create two dummies that take value one when a VC (or an independent VC) has any liquidation
right. The PUT OPTION dummy takes value one when then VC has the right to put his shares
to the entrepreneur after a specific period of time, that is when he is able to force a buy-back
by the entrepreneur. The DRAG ALONG tells us whether the VC has the right to force the
entrepreneur to sell his stake to an (outside) bidder while the TAKE ALONG dummy tells us
whether the VC has the right to demand from the entrepreneur to include his stake in any sale
of the entrepreneur’s stake. We code all this variables to take value if these rights are presents.
Sometimes qualifying conditions are present. However, for sake of simplicity, we do not consider
these elements here.
The EXIT RIGHTS dummy is the sum of the sale rights found in the sample, that is the sum of
the dummy for the existence for an anti-dilution protection, the VC’s preemption right dummy,
the drag and take (tag) along dummies and finally the info duty dummy. The preemption right
allows the VC to buy the entrepreneur’s stake in the firm if the entrepreneur were to sell his stake
for the price paid by the potential buyer, while the info duty dummy forces the entrepreneur to
inform the VC about potential buyers of the firm that approach the entrepreneur. We also code
the presence of IPO rights: Piggy back rights allow the VC to include his shares in any offering
of the founder’s shares in a public market, while the priority registration right allows the VC to
register his shares with priority to those of the entrepreneur in case not all can be listed at once.
We also know whether the VC has a LIQUIDATION PREFERENCE (that is if his claims are
senior to those of the entrepreneur, even if both hold equity). We also have a dummy variable
called RIGHT TO REPLACE ENTREPRENEUR that takes value one exactly when the VC has
this right. ANTI-COMPETITION CLAUSE takes value one if the VC has the right to ban the
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entrepreneur to work in a related industry if he leaves the firm. Finally FOUNDER VESTING
takes value one if the entrepreneur is not allowed to keep all his equity in firm if he resigns from
his position in the firm. We do not discern whether there is a difference between the VC firing
the entrepreneur or the entrepreneur leaving on his own.
Other Variables
Finally, we observe several other variables. TIME TO EXIT denotes the time the VC thinks he
needs to exit the venture34. The DUMMY TRADE SALE EXPECTED indicates whether the
VC thinks that a trade sale is expected by the VC. This expectation is often stated by the VC
in his investment memorandum. The fact that this is stated in the investment memorandum
means that the VC expects this prior to him signing the contract with the entrepreneur, but
that the entrepreneur is not necessarily aware of this. Therefore, causality should run from the
expectation of the possibility of a TS to the inclusion of the term in the contract.
34 We often had no information about this variable, as we took it directly from the VC’s investment memorandi.
For the programmes covered, KfW’s maximum investment horizon was ten years. Thus, we set this variable
to 10 when we faced an investment with debt only and no information about the expected contract duration.
We ran robustness checks and found no differences in our results.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Sample selection
-1997 1998 - 2000 2000 - 2004 Total
1 51 102 22 175
10 0 12 4 16
11 0 8 1 9
100 4 16 2 22
1000 1 33 32 66
1001 0 6 3 9
1010 0 1 1 2
1011 0 1 0 1
Total 56 179 65 300
Notes: Summary statistics for 464 investment rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms by venture capital funds. In this table,
the structure of the underlying sample with respect to program choice and the respective period of time are presented.
1 = Technology Participation Programme (KfW/BMWA + KfW/BMTF - Technologie-Beteiligungsprogramm); 10 =
ERP-Innovation Programme (ERP-Innovationsprogramm (Beteiligungsvariante)); 100 = Guarantee Programme (KfW-
Risikokapitalprogramm - Garantien); 1000 = Fund Programme (KFW-Risikokapitalprogramm - Fondsfinanzierung); and
mixes.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Number of portfolio firms 290
# of financing rounds 464
# of VCs 91
# of Firms financed Ø 5
Median 2
Total size of investment Ø TEUR 5403
Median TEUR 1305
Age Ø 4.77
Median 3.00
Stages Seed 10,3%
Early 56,2%
Expansion 19,0%
Late 6,0%
No info 8,5%
Legal form GmbH 70%
AG 28%
Others 2%
Origin Germany 92%
France 1%
UK 2%
Others 5%
Industry Bio/Biotech 5%
Medicine 12%
IT/Software 27%
Telecom 6%
Internet 10%
Auto/Eng 0.15
Chemistry 4%
Others 14 %
Syndication Ø 39%
# of partners 3.69
Median 3.00
Staging No Staging Staging
Complete Sample 135 (0.30) 311 (0.70)
Period 1 18 (0.28) 46 (0.72)
Period 2 86 (0.34) 167 (0.66)
Period 3 33 (0.24) 106 (0.76)
Independent VC 66 (0.31) 215 (0.69)
Public VC 44 (0.45) 54 (0.55)
Other VC Types 27 (0.36) 48 (0.64)
Notes: Summary statistics for 464 investment rounds into 290 entrepreneurial
firms by venture capital funds. The statistics given are the averages per round,
not per firm. For staging and staging modes first column refers to the number
of observations and the second to the percentage.
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Table 4: Summary statistics II: security choice
Category Equity Debt & Equity Convertibles Debt
Description Pure Equity Debt> Debt< US Style Convertible Mixes Nonstandard Pure
Equity + LP Equity Equity US Style Equity Debt Debt
Category 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 4 9
Upside cash flow rights X X X X X X X X -
Downside protection - X X - X X X X X
Change of control - - X X X - X X X
Cash flow rights at exit X X X X X X X - -
Voting rights X X X X - X X - -
51 85 157 20 11 10 16 11 96
Total Percentage 29% 38% 8% 23%
Notes: In this table, we report the VC’s security choice of 91 German funds for 464 investment rounds into 290 en-
trepreneurial firms. We categorize each security according to five characteristics: upside cash-flow rights, downside pro-
tection, changes of control in defaults, sash-flow rights when the firm is sold and voting rights. We have ten missing
values.
Table 5: Summary statistics III: dynamic security choice
Category Equity Debt & Equity Convertibles Debt
Description Pure Equity Debt> Debt< US Style Convertible Mixes Nonstandard Pure
Equity + LP Equity Equity US Style Equity Debt Debt
Category 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 4 9 Total
Period 1 # 7 1 25 1 0 0 1 5 26 67
% 10.45 1.49 37.31 1.49 0.00 0.00 1.49 7.46 38.81 100.00
2 # 31 37 102 12 4 2 11 2 52 257
% 12.06 14.40 39.69 4.67 1.56 0.78 4.28 0.78 20.23 100.00
3 # 13 47 30 7 7 8 4 4 18 140
% 9.29 33.57 21.43 5.00 5.00 5.71 2.86 2.86 12.86 100.00
Total # 51 85 157 20 11 10 16 11 96 464
% 10.99 18.32 33.84 4.31 2.37 2.16 3.45 2.37 20.69 100.00
Notes: In this table, we report the security choice of 91 German venture capital funds for 464 investment rounds into
290 entrepreneurial firms over three different time periods. Period 1 are the years 1990-1997, period 2 are the years
1998-2000 and period 3 are the years 2001-2004. We categorize each security according to five characteristics: upside
cash-flow rights, downside protection, changes of control in defaults, sash-flow rights when the firm is sold and voting
rights. We have ten missing values.
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Table 14: Liquidation Rights: Substitutes or Complements?
Staging Types
Put Option No Staging Milestones Rounds Mixes No. of Obs
Pure Equity
no 20 9 18 43 90
yes 6 1 4 9 20
Debt/Equity
no 36 18 25 35 114
yes 7 7 3 16 33
Convertibles
no 5 8 6 10 29
yes 0 0 1 2 3
Pure Debt
no 39 10 8 33 90
yes 0 0 2 3 5
Notes: This table shows the relation of three types of liquidation rights: Staging, Debt and Put
Options: The left hand side shows the use of certain types of securities used, including Debt-Equity
Mixes and Pure Debt. For each type of security, the use of put options is analyzed, differentiated
on the right by the type of staging encountered.
Table 15: Liquidation Rights: Substitutes or Complements II?
Put Option Debt Staging
Put Option 1
Debt -0.0358 1
Staging 0.0854* -0.1310*** 1
Notes: This table presents the pairwise correlations between the three liquidation rights used: Put-
Options, Debt and Staging. Asterisks note the usual significance levels: * notes significance at the
10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** a at the 1% level.
Table 16: Relation of Exit Covenants and IPO Rights
IPO Rights
Trade-Sale Rights 0 1 2 Total
0 100 0 0 100
1 31 0 0 31
2 46 0 0 46
3 67 2 0 69
4 39 2 4 45
5 1 2 1 4
Total 284 6 5 295
Notes: Summary statistics for 464 investment rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms by venture
capital funds. The table describes the relation of the number of IPO rights to the number of trade-
sale rights. There is a maximum of two IPO rights (Piggy Back Rights and Priority Registration
rights) while there are five relevant trade-sale rights: Information Duty, Preemption Right, Drag
Along, Take Along and Anti-Dilution Protection.
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